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Abstract 
Following Douglas and Kristeva, Sibley theorizes in Geographies of Exclusion that 
socio-spatial boundaries necessarily activate discourses of purity and impurity. Yet 
there is also a second, more sophisticated theory present in the text. Sibley offers 
three qualifications to Douglas and Kristeva, emphasizing the culturally specific nature 
of purity and impurity classifications, their status as contested and metaphorical 
discourses, and their irreducibly spatial organization and operation. Furthermore, 
beyond these qualifications, a close reading of the grain of Sibley’s argument 
suggests an account in which (a) temporal closeness to the origin and (b) spatial 
homogeneity are the standard against which “purity” is measured. Purity and 
impurity, then, would not attend any “matter out of place” but operate within 
particular cultural contexts as assessments of whether a phenomenon or space 
corresponds, in its relative homogeneity, to its impure origin and essence. This 
perspective offers support for addressing the materiality of purity and impurity 
discourses. 
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Introduction 
Mackenzie (2004, p. x) observes that we live in “an age scarred by the actions of regimes in 
pursuit of purity.” Yet “purity is an ideal that secures many of our most deeply felt attachments 
to our sense of self, our relations with others and the ebb and flow of cultural life.” Yet, besides 
the ideas of Douglas and Kristeva, commentators have described the topic as “under theorized” 
(Campkin, 2007, p. 79), despite the growth of scholarship addressing topics such as waste, 
genetically modified food, immigration and detention, household materialities, and dirty work. 
In other articles, we have assessed the work in the social sciences and humanities for material 
for new paradigm for making sense of purity and impurity discourses (e.g., Duschinsky, 2011, 
2012, 2013; Duschinsky & Lampitt, 2012). We are interested here to attend further to the role 
of space in constituting relations coded as pure or impure. 
We begin from the qualification, noted since Thompson (1978, p. 91), that while the idea 
that “dirt is matter out of place” identifies a significant regularity, more precision is needed 
since this only sometimes holds. O’Brien (2006, p. 125) has argued that, for “forty years,” 
scholars of dirt, impurity, and waste have been led astray in theorizing these topic by the 
“formidable sway” that the idea that “dirt is matter out of place” has held “over the sociological 
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imagination of unclean things.” He suggests that the “thesis does not service the analytical 
needs of contemporary social inquiry and must be overturned” (p. 143). Likewise, Ellis (2011, 
p. 890) has advised that we do not “continue to linger in Mary Douglas’ shadow. Douglas’ 
work is as influential as it is potentially misleading.” Simon (2012) and Zhong and House 
(2013) have described the topic as having remained rather a theoretical “blind-spot,” despite 
rising attention to purity and impurity in both social scientific and philosophical research over 
the past decade. 
Yet something about the phrase popularized by Douglas, which links dirt and matter with 
place, has contained sufficient acuity to crowd out for decades the spread of several possible 
alternate conceptualizations whose potential contributions we have surveyed elsewhere. Further 
reflection on purity and impurity needs, we feel, to grapple with the question: What is it about 
place, specifically, that means that “matter” which is “out” of it may well be understood as 
dirt? This question aligns with concerns raised that in responding to the “cultural turn” in 
analyzing constructions and classifications of identity and difference, we do not homogenize 
and reify processes as cultural all-in-the-same-way and thereby lose attention to specifically 
geographical insights (e.g., Wylie, 2010). The question also echoes a number of other voices in 
the social sciences (e.g., Cloke, 2005; Gregson & Crang, 2010; Hawkins, 2006; Moore, 2012) 
in demanding further investigation specifically into the role of place in processes of defilement. 
Particularly vocal among these voices have been antiracist and materialist geographers, whose 
empirical research into topics ranging from national belonging to industrial waste have 
emphasized the significance of the topic (e.g., Edensor, 2010; Gidwani & Reddy, 2011; 
Gregson, 2012; Hawkins, 2003; Jewitt, 2011; Krupar, 2011). 
Though attention to his work has perhaps slackened in recent years, attention to the work of 
David Sibley is an important resource for addressing the question of the precise relation that 
links place to purity. The reason for this is that his book, Geographies of Exclusion, not only 
applies ideas from Douglas and Kristeva but also—though this has been little noticed—
observes how they break down and become ineffective. Geographies of Exclusion has 
generally been seen by scholars to “provide a striking example of the way Mary Douglas’ work 
on defilement and pollution can be put to good use” (Freitas, 2008, p. 55), and has therefore 
also has been criticized for reproducing the flaws with Douglas’ account of the interaction 
between purity, classification, and place. For instance, Young (2007, p. 141) asserts that “the 
problem with such theorisation, most eloquently advocated in David Sibley’s book 
Geographies of Exclusion (1995), is that it tends to depict such othering or demonization as a 
cultural universal” by always situating them as expression of a “need for social groups to 
maintain boundaries.” Yet the close reading of the grain of Sibley’s argument presented here 
will identify three key places in which he innovates on Douglas and Kristeva in ways that have 
been neglected by subsequent scholars. In this way, Sibley’s work will be read as a signpost 
toward a new social theory of the relationship between place and purity, with implications 
across the humanities and social sciences. 
Dirt as Matter Out of Place 
In Purity and Danger (1966/2002) and her article on “Pollution” (1968/1975a), Douglas 
claimed that classifications of purity and impurity are activated by an innate ordering 
mechanism in the human mind. These categories help preserve the social order of society as a 
whole, by marking that which is “anomalous” to this order as impure: 
Lord Chesterfield defined dirt as matter out of place. This implies only two conditions, a set of 
ordered relations and a contravention of that order. Thus the idea of dirt implies a structure of idea. 
For us dirt is a kind of compendium category for all events which blur, smudge, contradict or 
otherwise confuse accepted classifications. (Douglas, 1968/1975, p. 51) 
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As Fardon (1999, p. 84) has noted, Purity and Danger presents “a potentially bewildering 
richness of both constructive and critical arguments.” However, the dominant argument treats 
purity and impurity as the result of ordered relations and a contravention of that order. This has 
been the paradigm most often taken from Douglas’ work, despite the fact that she later 
explicitly retracted her claim that impurity “spontaneously” attends “matter out of place” and 
urged younger scholars to investigate further which specifically among the kinds of 
classifications are associated with purity and impurity (Douglas, 1997, 1998). 
In Powers of Horror, Kristeva (1980/1982) explicitly builds on this argument from 
Douglas’ work by threading it through phenomenological and psychoanalytic concern with the 
boundary between self and other. Kristeva defines “abjection” as “the repugnance, the retching 
that thrusts me to the side and turns me away from defilement, sewage, and muck. The shame 
of compromise, of being in the middle of treachery” (p. 2). She agrees with Douglas that it is 
“not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. 
What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” 
(Kristeva, 1980/1982, p. 4). Kristeva superimposes on Douglas’ argument the proposal that 
what runs against “order” is impure because of its association with the early, infantile period of 
human life before the distinction of subjects from objects, self from mother: “defilement is the 
translinguistic spoor of the most archaic boundaries of the self’s clean and proper body. In that 
sense, if it is a jettisoned object, it is so from the mother” (Kristeva, 1980/1982, p. 74). While 
there are other currents to her argument, which we have traced and utilized elsewhere 
(Duschinsky, 2013) the dominant strand of Kristeva’s account of impurity follows Douglas in 
presuming that pollution attends that which transgresses classificatory boundaries. In The Sense 
and Non-Sense of Revolt (1996/2000, p. 21), Kristeva affirms that her elaboration is in full 
agreement with Douglas’ “first rule” of impurity: “The impure is that which does not respect 
boundaries.” 
Three Innovations 
Sibley’s Geographies of Exclusion situates itself primarily as an application of these ideas from 
Douglas and Kristeva, which theorize dirt as matter out of place. For Sibley (1995), these 
theorists have shown why purity and impurity are to be found in a “remarkably consistent” way 
in “the construction of geographies of exclusion” (p. 69). The premise is that “the act of 
drawing the line in the construction of discrete categories interrupts what is naturally 
continuous. It is by definition an arbitrary act” (p. 35). To occlude this arbitrariness of this act 
in the construction of ostensibly bounded and integral spaces and selves, a discourse of purity 
is used to construct the “inner (pure) self,” in contrast to “the outer (defiled) self,” which is 
projected onto social “others” (p. 27). Hence, purity and impurity are apiece with exclusionary 
“attitudes towards people and place which are deeply embedded in western societies, although 
in liberal discourse they are conveyed with greater subtlety” (p. 62). Sibley raises, in particular, 
the role of purity and impurity in nationalist discourses. Drawing on the idea that dirt is matter 
out of place, he follows his reading of Douglas and Kristeva to suggest that purity and impurity 
are used to characterize human beings when “the national boundary may be breached by alien 
others” (p. 109). 
Yet qualifications are made in the text of the idea that “dirt is matter out of place” as a 
theory of purity and impurity. Arguing against Douglas and Kristeva, who tend to presume a 
universal desire for categorical divisions, Sibley (1995) contends that “the need to make sense 
of the world by categorising things on the basis of crisp sets—A, not-A, and so on—is evident 
in most cultures, although I do not think it is a universal need” (p. 32). Sibley documents 
several such cultural differences in the degree to which purity and impurity discourses are 
mobilized. In particular, he notes that “the urge to make separations, between clean and dirty, 
ordered and disordered, ‘us’ and ‘them’ . . . is reinforced by the culture of consumption in 
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western societies,” since we are led to believe in “the possibility of achieving a comforting 
state of purity through consumption” (pp. 8, 63). Sibley thus inserts the dynamics organizing 
cultural variation as a mediator between socio-spatial structures and classifications of purity 
and impurity. He states that it is only “for the individual or group socialised into believing that 
the separation of categories is necessary or desirable” that “liminal zones or spaces of 
ambiguity” are experienced as “a zone of abjection, one which should be eliminated” (p. 33). 
Whereas Douglas and Kristeva have been criticized for presuming that purity and impurity 
classifications will always mirror classificatory structures, such as the boundaries of the body 
(e.g., Goodnow, 2010; Seidman, 2013), Sibley starts to note that this will be the case when 
categorical separations have been constructed in particular ways. 
A second, related qualification lies in the fact that representations of impurity are not, as in 
Douglas (1968/1975a, p. 58), a “spontaneous byproduct” of classificatory orders for Sibley. 
Rather, they are regarded as a discursive construction in the course of situated practices of one 
set of phenomena as equivalent to another: a material “metaphor” (Sibley, 1995, pp. 18, 53). 
For example, in 19th-century British portrayals of the poor, “the significance of excrement in 
this account is that it stands for residual people and residual places” (Sibley, 1995, p. 56). This 
attention to impurity as material metaphor suggests a much more dynamic account, in which 
there is no universal division between “in place” and “out of place” but rather the potential for 
the discursive construction of phenomena as dirty, shitty, and sluttish. Kristeva herself has also 
implicitly ceded this point. She attempts to qualify Douglas’ general claim that all bodily fluids 
will be classified as impure since they breach body boundaries by stating more precisely that 
“excrement and its equivalents (decay, infection, disease, corpse, etc.) stand for [italics added] 
the danger to identity that comes from without” whereas “menstrual blood, on the contrary, 
stands for [italics added] the danger issuing from within identity (social or sexual)” (Kristeva, 
1980/1982, p. 71). Ahmed (2005, p. 102) has urged readers to consider this passage from 
Powers of Horror carefully, and to note Kristeva’s precise argument here which is not in line 
with her other, more structuralist, statements on themes of impurity. Instead, what is implied is 
that purity and impurity discourses strike a parallel, within a context which renders this parallel 
intelligible, between the material physicality of a substance and a form of subjectivity or 
experience. As we have shown elsewhere, this qualification of the anomaly theory suggests an 
opening to reread Kristeva in a way that circumvents her more structuralist moments, while 
maintaining the insights she offers into how the materiality of defilement becomes affectively 
loaded (Duschinsky, 2013). 
The third, and certainly the most important, qualification made by Sibley (1995) to the 
proposal that “dirt is matter out of place” is that “the social and spatial contexts of abjection 
need considerable elaboration” (p. 11). In discussion with us about this claim, Sibley has 
explained that “Julia Kristeva did not explore social aspects of abjection much and certainly not 
spatial problems, except in relation to the body. Mary Douglas . . . did not apply her ideas to 
everyday life in developed societies or material spaces” (personal communication, 2013). In 
Geographies of Exclusion, Sibley suggests that “dirt is matter out of place” is a necessarily 
geographical insight. Sibley implies that Douglas’ invocation of spatial imagery in describing 
classifications as a matter of “in” or “out of place” is not coincidental: Purity and impurity 
classifications have an indelibly spatial element to them, though he does not address why this is 
precisely. Yet in itself, this is an important point, as it advances beyond Douglas’ concern with 
symbolic boundaries, and helps us inquire about the precise properties of “place,” which mean 
that it appears as an obvious representative of categorical settledness and innerness, in contrast 
to the swirl and externality of dirt. 
As a result of these three qualifications, Sibley’s text displays the tensions of his theoretical 
allegiance to Douglas’ paradigm in the face of a simultaneous recognition of its shortcomings. 
Figure 3.1 of the text displays a set of Venn diagrams, showing the ambiguous overlap between 
A and not-A, private and public, child and adult, which Douglas’ paradigm situates as impure; 
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the Venn diagram itself is Douglas’ own preferred method of illustrating her point (see 
Douglas, 1972/1975b). Yet the caption to this diagram does not identify ambiguity as impure. 
Rather, Sibley is only able to state cautiously that “danger, or at least uncertainty, lies in 
marginal states” (Sibley, 1995, p. 33). Sibley reads Douglas as suggesting that “to separate 
presumes a categorisation of things as pure or defiled,” yet acknowledges that even Douglas 
“herself recognised the limitations of her original thesis” since there are clear cases where 
“people were not really that concerned about defilement and happily mixed discrepant 
categories” (Sibley, 1995, p. 37). He thus finds that Douglas’ explanatory account is not 
adequate but does identify an important regularity: “at the social level, as at the individual 
level, an awareness of group boundaries can [italics added] be expressed in the opposition 
between purity and defilement” (Sibley, 1995, pp. 36-38). However, Sibley (1995) is not 
satisfied with the degree of precision this formulation is able to achieve; he admits that 
representations of defilement are only a “reaction to certain kinds of difference” (p. 183), but 
does not specify the occasions that will lead to such a reaction. 
Sibley indicates that Douglas’ paradigm presents us with a significant regularity, but not an 
explanation. This is not, in itself, a new conclusion. In Hellenism and Christianity, Bevan 
(1921) argued that the idea that dirt is 
matter in the wrong place plainly does not help us much since if the field of the disagreeable and 
the noxious extends in one direction beyond that of the polluting, it is equally true that we regard a 
good deal as dirt, which we could not show to be particularly noxious or painful. The two fields 
overlap, but they do not coincide. (p. 144) 
What is exciting about rereading Sibley’s work is that as well as identifying limitations with 
the paradigm he deploys, the grain of his argument also moves in innovative ways beyond it. 
Recalcitrant Heterogeneity 
If the explanation of themes of purity and impurity in terms of “order” and “disorder” is 
recognized as too general, are there other explanatory resources in Sibley’s account for 
addressing the problem? One argument that Sibley (1995) puts forward in chapter 3 is that 
“Douglas’s argument about purification and defilement” only holds in “closed, tightly knit 
communities . . . in times of crisis, when the identity of the community is threatened” (p. 38). 
However, he elsewhere dismisses this explanation, and states in the Conclusion that “the desire 
for a purified identity . . . seems to be unaffected by the cross-currents of culture which are 
characteristic of recent global change” (p.184). 
A second explanatory principle that Sibley (1995) suggests, given his repudiation of 
Douglas’ appeal to a universal human desire for order, is that “homogeneity” is seen to be a 
“morally superior condition to one where there is mixing because mixing (of social groups and 
of diverse activities in space) caries the threat of contamination and a challenge to hegemonic 
values” (p. 39). Discourses of purity and impurity will be “recursively related” to socio-spatial 
regions, such as the suburb or the home, “where there is internal homogeneity and clear, strong 
boundaries separate that space from others”: The region’s assumed qualitative homogeneity 
makes it available for representation by hegemonic values as pure. In turn, its representation as 
pure can contribute legitimacy to calls for the eradication of “mixing” or “difference,” which 
represents “the threat of pollution” (Sibley, 1995, pp. 80-81, 92). Sibley (1995) also notes that 
there are “spaces comprising the home or locality which can be polluted by the presence of 
non-conforming people, activities or artefacts” (p. 91). Again this term “non-conforming” 
suggests the presence of recalcitrant heterogeneity, where a particular vision of homogeneity is 
situated by hegemonic values as both natural and preferred. He gives the example of the 
countryside as a space traditionally imagined as pure since “pictured as stable, culturally 
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homogenous, historically unchanging” in which the “the cultural heterogeneity of the 
countryside . . . has to be denied” (Sibley, 1995, p. 108). 
Against the idea that “dirt is matter out of place,” this line of argument in Geographies of 
Exclusion indicates that themes of purity and impurity are contingent discourses, deployed 
where a distinction between homogeneity and mixing is salient as the measure of the extent to 
which subjects and spaces have been removed from correspondence with their essence through 
the intrusion of heterogeneity. This is, we believe, no less than an acute re-theorization of 
purity and impurity discourses. It does not suggest that all purity and impurity discourses are 
the same. Rather, it suggests that the idea that essence underpins existence (Marcuse, 
1936/1968), characteristic of but far from limited to Western cultures, facilitates purity and 
impurity discourses as a measure of correspondence between the two in terms of the relative 
disruption of that correspondence by heterogeneous, foreign or inferior elements. It must be 
emphasized, in contrast to Douglas (1966/2002, p. 43) for whom “the difference between 
pollution behaviour in one part of the world and another is only a matter of detail,” the idea of 
an essence underpinning existence is a culturally and historically variable assumption. This 
assumption is significant for many areas of discourse—for example, in globalized Western 
discourses on national identity. In his recently published Will to Know lectures, Foucault 
(1971/2013, pp. 192-193) described the use of purity and impurity to characterize the extent to 
which reality corresponds to the natural order of things as “the most fundamental thing to be 
found in the determination of true discourse as it functions in Western societies.” Yet this 
characterization should not be seen as universal, either within or beyond Western cultures. For 
example, Hawkins (2003, p. 51) discusses a house without drains in which a garden seat serves 
as a worm farm for shit, producing “another way of ordering the relation between pure and 
impure,” which does not defend a home in which impurity is continually undergoing expulsion. 
Yet in the dominant form of purity and impurity discourse, Sibley’s discussion of 
heterogeneity suggests that phenomena, whether spaces and forms of subjectivity, are assessed 
in terms of two qualities: homogeneity/heterogeneity and closeness/distance from an imputed 
natural origin. That is to say, “pure” spaces or forms of subjectivity do not contain any 
heterogeneous, foreign or inferior elements; all of their constitutive elements are “the same” in 
some relevant sense; at the same time, “pure” spaces or forms of subjectivity are understood 
not to have deviated from their essence, as the ground for their existence. The idea of such an 
essential ground situates existent phenomena as depending for their existence on a foundational 
truth and natural state, to which they by degrees correspond or deviate. “Place” and impurity 
thus stand opposed when—as is often, but not always, the case (Casey, 2001; Massey, 2005)—
place is perceived as a stable and homogenous state, the natural baseline against which 
difference is ever an intrusion or corruption. It is then that “dirt is matter out of place.” 
When taken to be a property of “purity,” homogeneity thus is taken to have a more 
originary status than empirical reality in its multiplicity. Homogeneity represents alignment 
between existence and its essence, between phenomena in the world and their true location 
within being. And in turn, compared with purity, the presence of heterogeneity must therefore 
be a spatial intrusion on the very correspondence of the phenomenon or form of subjectivity 
with its essential truth (or the suggestion that the intruder was already there). If a pristinely 
white piece of paper is (falsely) taken to be the originary state of paper, then any mark on it 
will be both a spatial and a temporal disturbance (see Warren, 2003[AQ2]). Moreover, when 
phenomena such as spaces or forms of subjectivity are assessed by the measure of “purity,” a 
movement in space away from homogeneity is therefore taken to be also a movement in time 
away from the origin, and vice versa. If the purity of a suburb or a girl or a chemical element is 
depicted as disturbed by elements foreign to it, this will also imply a departure from an 
originary, essential state. Claims about heterogeneity can therefore smuggle claims about 
distance from an original state. Likewise, if the purity of a suburb or a girl or a chemical 
element is depicted as no longer present, the frame of purity supports the conclusion that the 
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reason for this is a spatial disturbance of a prior state of integrity. For when constructed 
through appeals to purity/impurity, social space can be quietly encoded as time, and time as 
space, since both are positioned as treading parallel axes toward or away from purity. We feel 
that it is this semantic organization of purity and impurity that underpins Sibley’s insight that 
purity and impurity are both key themes for geographers and also necessarily spatial 
discourses. 
This perspective suggests an account of the modalities according to which purification 
occurs spatially. It has often been noted by geographers that there is an “association of spatial 
penetration with impurity” (Morley, 1999[AQ3], p. 157), that “very often such geographical 
distancing goes hand in hand with discourses of filth” (Modan, 2002, p. 479). Yet this 
association only sometimes holds, and our analysis not only explains when but also why. Not 
all boundaries between “places” operate in the same way, producing purity and impurity 
discourses. To take an example, a boundary between two messes has been shown not to 
generally facilitate purity and impurity discourses but other discursive framings (Jones, 2009; 
Trotter, 2000). The link between spatial distancing and purity/impurity lies in the way that 
discourses of purity and impurity interpret correspondence of phenomena with their essence in 
terms of qualitative homogeneity and heterogeneity. Purity and impurity discourses situate the 
homogeneity of particular socio-spatial phenomena and forms of subjectivity as ontologically 
prior to heterogeneity, which must then be a corruption or intrusion. Exclusion comes to be 
depicted as the eradication or removal of the impure and the defense of the pure when it 
appears to uphold homogeneity and in so doing to maintain the correspondence between a place 
and its truth. Hence, the eradication or removal of marginal “others” (e.g., homeless 
individuals), when they are marked as heterogeneous to the true nature of public space, is 
routinely characterized under the umbrella term of “purification” (Deutsche, 1996). 
Material Imagination 
In Purity and Danger Douglas criticized materialism, arguing that such accounts ignore the 
classificatory systems that are the fundamental mechanism of purity and impurity 
classifications. Certainly she is correct to argue against the most reductive materialist 
explanations of themes of purity and impurity, which would place them as merely distorted 
recognitions of the real danger or safety of particular phenomena such as food. Yet, Kaika 
(2005) and Dürr and Jaffe (2010) have specifically suggested that scholars might advance 
beyond Sibley by attending to the materiality of phenomena, which facilitate their construction 
as pure or impure. Indeed, as Bernstein (2011, p. 24) has noted, in general the relationship 
between the material properties of an object and a classification as pure or impure “is 
flexible—not incidental.” 
For instance, whereas Marx (1867/2007) argued that the materiality of gold is irrelevant, 
Schoenberger (2011) has persuasively documented the way that the physical character of pure 
gold—noncorrosive, heavy but able to be circulated, quite unreactive, scarce, able to be 
polished to a sheen—has helped support the social use of gold as a material image of value 
itself. Or to take another example, the pure/impure connotations of milk in contemporary 
Western societies do not simply reflect and affirm pre-given structural boundaries between the 
rural and urban, human and animal, male and female, and private and public. Rather, the 
sensuous materiality of milk as a substance evocative of a homogenous and originary 
(maternal) essence has been mobilized in different ways, through processes of scientific 
investigation, commodification, and mobilization in moral discourses. It has also positively 
contributed to the dynamic discursive, material and affective biopolitics of rural/urban, 
human/animal, male/female and private/public as naturalized categories (Atkins, 2010; Boyer, 
2010). The construction of milk as pure should not be seen as a homeostatic process affirming 
the status quo of society, but rather as a site of contested discourses regarding an essence 
8 Space and Culture XX(X) 
 
conceived of as qualitatively homogenous and originary. This is illustrated, for instance, by the 
growth of ruralist counter-discourses in late 20th-century Britain on the healthiness and purity 
of “raw,” unpasteurized milk as more originary, and as uncontaminated by cleaning 
technologies (Enticott, 2003). 
In the paradigm which emerged with Douglas “dirt as matter out of place” is used to mean 
that phenomena will be marked as impure when they breach categorical boundaries. Yet the 
history of the phrase itself suggests highlights the importance of a materiality that a focus 
exclusively on classification and anomaly risks ignoring. The phrase “dirt is matter out of 
place” is attributed by Douglas to Lord Chesterton. Chesterton’s mention of the phrase, in 1852 
at the Royal Agricultural Society, ran: “I have heard it said that dirt is nothing but a thing in a 
wrong place. Now, the dirt of our towns precisely corresponds with that definition.” The reason 
for this, he argues, is that human dirt, while out of place in the city, has special properties for 
enriching the soil that make it useful as manure in the countryside. He went on to argue that 
anyone who did not recognize these special material properties was “ignorant” (cited in Ashley 
1879, p. 363). In contrast to Douglas’ nonmaterialist focus on classificatory systems and 
anomalies (see O’Brien, 2006), which animates the dominant narrative of Geographies of 
Exclusion, the strand of Sibley’s work we have excavated suggests a conceptualization of 
purity as a discursive comparison of phenomena, such as spaces or forms of subjectivity, with 
their imputed self-identical truth. We feel that this could be compatible with more sophisticated 
versions of a materialist approach, while retaining a concern for the social construction of 
reality—in line with Bachelard’s (1942/1983, p. 141) insight that any adequate “psychology of 
purification is dependent on material imagination” (see also Kirsch, 2012). 
To take an example, Sibley (1995, p. 24) notes that “whiteness as a symbol of purity,” as “a 
marker of the boundary between purified interior spaces—the home, the nation, and so on—
and exterior threats posed by dirt, disorderly minorities or immigrants.” Drawing on the 
perspective we have elaborated here from Sibley’s work, it can be suggested that the 
materiality of whiteness does not determine by any means, but certainly facilitates purity 
discourses. We would suggest that its uniformity of whiteness can be used to signify qualitative 
homogeneity, its emptiness can be mobilized to signify a transparent correspondence between 
phenomena or forms of subjectivity and their originary state, and the immediate visibility of 
any mark suggests a fragile vulnerability which makes any deviation already of great 
magnitude. Through purity and impurity discourses, racial whiteness can be situated as of 
greater epistemological and moral relevance and value than other or mixed significations of 
color. Unlike these other forms, whiteness as purity is taken to be in transparent 
correspondence with the very essence of the world. Indeed, Fanon (1952/1967) and Berthold 
(2010), inter alia, have documented the way in which the construction of “whiteness” as purity 
in aesthetic and racial discourses have supported one another, such that each appears as the 
seemingly natural state from which other forms are a secondary deviation. It is such a semantic 
operation which helped, as Sibley (1995) notes, images of “the perfection of white Europeans . 
. . ease the way” for colonialism and genocides (p. 52). 
More generally in discourses on racial purity, a variety of socially policed practices are 
mobilized to construct this identity as the ever-threatened expression of an essence, with this 
essence conceptualized as qualitatively homogenous and prior to its instantiations. Such 
practices may include, for instance, category-based endogamy (only reproducing with 
individuals of the same category as oneself), efforts to represent geographical territories as 
naturally bounded, and discursive practices which press for the (self-)regulation of young 
women, constructed as a key site for the biological and cultural reproduction of the next 
generation of the nation. Identifying such an appeal to homogeneity and origin as the ground of 
all true existing forms in nationalist discourses, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) have 
suggested that 
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From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are 
only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be. The dividing line is not between 
inside and outside but rather is internal to simultaneous signifying chains and successive subjective 
choices. (p. 197) 
Purity and impurity do not organize and police a boundary between normal and abnormal, 
which is naturally aligned with a division between inside and outside, or “us” and “them”; 
rather, they judge phenomena on their relative correspondence to their ostensive truth. Sibley 
(1995, p. 110) gestures toward this when he states that “the myth of cultural homogeneity is 
needed to sustain the nation state . . . informed by notions of purity and defilement.” Yet the 
very appearance of such an essence as a natural and neutral foundation for reality can be seen 
to depend on the ongoing process of materialized judgments of improper divergence and 
heterogeneity. At the level of social practice, “a race is not defined by its purity but rather by 
the impurity conferred upon it by a system of domination. Bastard and mixed-blood are the true 
names of race” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 379). A citizen is racially pure if you 
believe that he instantiates solely the nation, at the essence of each true member of the national 
population within the national territory. 
The greater acuity of this account, compared to “dirt as matter out of place,” can be 
illustrated using the case of Trinidadian nationalism. Munasinghe (2002[AQ4]) has examined 
how a heterogeneous population has meant that 
post-colonial states, like Trinidad . . . have been marked as acutely hybrid or impure (a 
consequence of their colonial history), yet faced with the historical task of establishing and 
maintaining “purity” in their pursuit of nationhood (an imperative set by modular Europe) . . . so 
that they too can be considered ‘legitimate nations’ within the international order. (p. 666) 
France, England, and Germany could point to a fictional but by degrees plausible autochthony 
of their population, a timeless history, whiteness as the basis for the national homogeneity that 
constitutes national identity; by contrast, the population of Trinidad is overly a “racial and 
cultural mixture” (2002, p. 687). Douglas’ theory of “a set of ordered relations and a 
contravention of that order” as the conditions for purity and impurity classifications might 
apply to some degree to those European nationalisms which can present themselves as a set of 
timeless ordered relations. “Dirt as matter out of place” does work to some degree with the 
European cases, in predicting that foreigners will be marked as impure as they breach the 
internal and external boundaries of the nation. Yet Kristeva (2004/2006) has herself observed 
that not all those who are foreign to the country in which they reside will be considered impure. 
Our theory would suggest that purity and impurity are facilitated when discursive actors 
invoke the homogeneity/heterogeneity of the national population or territory as a measure of its 
correspondence to what is imputed within globalized Western discourses as its essence, the 
nation. This is, indeed, the conclusion of Munasinghe regarding nationalist discourses that must 
contend with the hegemonic European narrative about purity as the measure of national 
identity. She notes that the assumption that the national identity predicated on “homogeneity 
can be achieved only with the creation of purity at the expense of impurity is an outcome of 
particular contingencies informing Western European national formations” (Munasinghe, 2002, 
p. 675). Munasinghe describes how nation-builders in Trinidad have responded to the 
hegemonic European nationalism narrative and their own acutely hybrid population with a 
discourse organized by an intricate dialectic: They have emphasized that their identity as a 
nation is formed through the distinctive mixture of different preexisting pure races. The product 
is not impurity, but the mixture of fragmented purities in a distinctive, indeed pure, calibration. 
The children of “Mother Trinidad and Tobago” are each marked in a homogenous way by a 
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distinctive heterogeneity of racial origins, a distinctiveness that allows each national subject to 
stand as a pure instantiation of a nation, as an essence: 
The Trinidadian narratives distinguish between two types of purity that are differentially positioned 
in relation to national identity—the purity of ancestral types that never passed through the cauldron 
of mixture and the purities that constitute parts of a mixture. The latter type of purity never 
represents a whole in and of itself; it is the purity that is created through the calibration of mixed 
instances. In contrast, the purity supposedly embodied by ethnic groups who never mixed, like the 
East Indians, does constitute wholes, and it is this type of purity that the Trinidadian nationalist 
narrative defines itself against. (Munasinghe 2002, p. 682) 
The case of Trinidadian nationalism illustrates our general claim that “a set of ordered 
relations and a contravention of that order” is too static an account to act as a theory of how 
purity and impurity discourses dynamically intersect and nest within one another. Rather, these 
discourses are more effectively analyzed as an assessment/construction of relative homogeneity 
and heterogeneity as a measure of correspondence between phenomena and an imputed 
essence. Munasinghe shows how Trinidadian nation-building discourse nests within hegemonic 
Western European assumptions about nations, and documents how the nation-builders have in 
practice used the particular heterogeneity of the population as a kind of commonality, a 
homogeneity which allows national subjects to be situated as manifesting a distinctive national 
essence. Purity and impurity here does not characterize matter out of place; they help organize 
place into an essence, while appearing merely to describe it. 
Conclusion 
Sibley’s Geographies of Exclusion applied the ideas of Douglas and Kristeva in thinking about 
the role of purity and impurity classifications in constructions of space. This paradigm has been 
described as “highly influential” by Hubbard, Kitchin, Bartley, and Fuller (2002), who also 
note its influence on subsequent research on themes of space, purity and impurity in areas such 
as bodily impairments, the homeless, sexual minorities, and ethnic minorities. Hubbard et al. 
(2002) argue that thanks in part to Sibley, purity and impurity have been recognized as 
especially important themes in the context of identity politics, as they are mobilized in the 
contestation of particular forms of subjectivity as proper and improper, located or dislocated. 
Yet the paradigm of “dirt as matter out of place” deployed by Sibley has received criticism as 
flawed, and cultural geography has moved on since Geographies of Exclusion, for example, in 
attending to the materiality of phenomena and forms of subjectivity classified as anomalous 
within dominant classificatory systems. However, this further work has not to date been 
translated into new theorizing on why dirt is sometimes matter out of place, and what 
assumptions about place make this dictum seem vivid and persuasive. 
Based on renewed attention to the struggle to apply the anomaly theory staged in Sibley’s 
Geographies of Exclusion, we have presented a new theoretical account that analyses purity 
and impurity discourses as a quite particular form of essentialism. We suggest that it is the 
presumption that pure phenomena do not diverge from their (purported) essence in time or 
space that facilitates the mobilization of purity and impurity discourses in spatial exclusion. 
Against the dominant narrative presented by Sibley, purity and impurity are not inevitably 
aligned with a division between inside and outside, or us and them. Instead, an undercurrent in 
his text, elaborated into a theory here, suggests that discourses of purity and impurity are best 
understood as assessments of phenomena and forms of subjectivity on their relative 
correspondence to their ostensive “essence.” If observed closely, however, the appearance of 
such an essence as a natural and neutral foundation for reality can be seen to depend on an 
ongoing, situated process of socio-spatial construction. Discourses of purity and impurity 
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assess two factors taken to be equivalent: temporal closeness to the origin and spatial 
homogeneity. These factors are taken as measures of the correspondence between particular 
bits of reality and their essential truth and foundational state. The measurement of alignment or 
deviation between subjects and spaces and their imputed essence will differ depending on 
epistemological conditions; we do not intend to suggest that phenomena which are assessed 
with respect to their purity simply do not exist or are “mere” social constructions, and we 
follow Hacking’s (1999) qualifications regarding the different degrees and forms of social 
construction. The Zinc in front of you is pure if it is completely composed of Zinc, as one of 
the basic Mendeleevian elements (Zn). The girl in front of you is sexually pure if you believe 
that her body, her experiences, and her desires do not deviate from a state of natural innocence. 
A more tendentious social construction is required to assess the purity of the girl than the purity 
of the Zinc (Duschinsky & Lampitt, 2012). 
It has further been argued that, where essence is taken to be the substratum of existence, 
purity/impurity discourses map a distinction between homogeneity and heterogeneity onto a 
distinction between primary and secondary. Difference from the origin is identified with the 
intrusion of heterogeneous, foreign or inferior elements into a pristine and prior essence—or as 
the recognition of such elements which must have been in the phenomena that had been taken 
to be pure all along. Within such a frame, difference from the perceived origin is identified 
with the intrusion of heterogeneous elements into a pristine and prior essence—or as the 
recognition of such elements which must have been in the phenomena that had been taken to be 
pure all along. In this way, judgments that establish what is to be seen as dirty, corrupt or 
polluted may be used to construct and naturalize an imputed originary essence, and vice versa. 
Purity and impurity, then, can be deployed such that an apparent assessment of a phenomenon 
in terms of its homogeneity/heterogeneity performatively serves to stabilize an imputed 
“essence” within discourse, as the measure of the truth and worth of particular phenomena, 
spaces or forms of subjectivity. In this light, purity should not simply be regarded as a quality 
of things “in place,” but a measure of phenomena or forms of subjectivity against what is 
thereby taken to be their essence. 
Pure processes, things, or people appear to be simple expressions of essence, with no 
dependence on anything outside of themselves. They are devoid of and prior to complexity and 
the dynamics that organize social and material inequalities. This makes purity and impurity a 
discursive, material and affective resource peculiarly adapted to facilitating social consensus, 
compelling a shared practical demand to protect or attain purity through the deployment of 
mechanisms of social exclusion and homogenization. That purity suggests that a phenomenon 
relies on no more than its own essence for its presence in existence means that purity and 
impurity discourses are well adapted to eliding the processes that produce places, people, and 
things. Where purity and impurity discourses serve as a strategic construction of phenomena as 
in a state of relative fidelity or infidelity, integrity or perversion, with respect to their essence, 
impure phenomena are those that have been morally and epistemologically devalued and 
demeaned by their indebtedness to elements besides their own purported essence. Interventions 
made in the name of purity are able to mould the phenomenon in question, even cutting away 
elements, in the name of its “own” essence since an imputed ideal serves to separate the real 
from the nonreal, the socially, morally or aesthetically valuable from the valueless. For 
example, as Opel (1999) and Berthold (2010) have shown in the case of bottled water, the 
construction of water itself as natural and pure occludes its extraction from the ground by 
industrial machines, its commodification as the property of a particular firm, and the global 
organization and exploitation of labor and resources that goes into bottling, marketing, and 
selling the item. Though representations of purity appear to signify that a phenomena or form 
of subjectivity stands prior to market forces, they are themselves precisely the result of the 
ongoing and artful process of commercial discursive, material, and affective construction. The 
images used to advertise Volvic or Evian of high, inaccessible mountains stages a quality for 
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the water being purchased as coming directly from a particular kind of “place”: prior to and 
untainted by all the human processes which are in fact the very condition of possibility of the 
bottle of water. 
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